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INTRODUCTION
States have the sovereign power to punish criminal offenders as
long as the constitutional rights of the accused are respected. 1 But
what happens when federal courts liberally disturb states’ interests in
the finality of verdicts and punishing those that commit crimes?
On December 3, 1998, Julie Jensen was discovered dead in her
home she shared with her husband, Mark, and her two sons. 2 Weeks
before Julie’s death she gave a handwritten letter to her neighbors to
give to the police in the event she died. 3 In the letter Julie detailed her
belief that her husband wanted her dead and would frame her death to

∗
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1
Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 555––56 (1998).
2
Jensen v. Clements (“Jensen”), 800 F.3d 892, 896 (7th Cir. 2015).
3
Id. at 895.
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look like a suicide. 4 After a police investigation, Mark Jensen was
charged with her murder. 5
Mark Jensen’s lawyers were unsuccessful in challenging the
admission of Julie’s letter, both before and during the trial, and her
letter took center stage. 6 At the end of the trial, Mark Jensen was
convicted of her murder and sentenced to life in prison. 7 Mark Jensen
appealed his conviction and the Wisconsin Appellate Court held the
admission of Julie’s letter, while violative of his right to confrontation,
was harmless error. 8 On writ of habeas corpus to the federal district
court, Mark Jensen gained relief, and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. 9
Errors in a criminal trial can be costly for both the defense and the
State. If the State makes an error in trial and a defendant is found not
guilty, the State cannot appeal the acquittal. 10 More seriously, if a
defendant is found guilty of a serious crime she did not commit, the
consequences can be horrific: the loss of freedom, the loss of
eligibility for public benefits such as food stamps, assisted housing,
federal student aid, the loss of opportunities to serve in the military or
jury service, and for non-citizens, deportation. 11 Nowhere else in the
law are the stakes higher. 12 With these high stakes, constitutional
4

Id.
Id.
6
Id.
7
Jensen v. Schwochert (“Jensen III”), No. 11-C-0803, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
177420, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 18, 2013).
8
State v. Jensen (“Jensen I”), 2007 WI 26, ¶ 57, 727 N.W.2d 518, 536.
9
Jensen, 800 F.3d at 894; Jensen III, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177420, at *1.
10
U.S. CONST. amend. V (prohibition for government appeal on acquittal) (“No
person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . nor shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb”).
11
Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on The Collateral Consequences
Of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated
Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 635–36 (2006).
12
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3591 (1994) (sentence of death possible for conviction of
certain offenses).
5
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protections exist at both the state and federal level to protect criminal
defendants from unjust and constitutionally violative practices. 13
However, when far-removed appellate courts make determinations of
fact with little or no deference to the state court decisions under
review, state court determinations may lose the finality and legality of
their convictions, undermining states’ sovereign rights and interests in
punishing those that break their laws. 14
One such protection for criminal defendants is the writ of habeas
corpus. 15 Known as the “great and efficacious writ,” it was once
referred to by William Blackstone as “another Magna Carta.” 16 Justice
Anthony Kennedy also once said that “[t]he writ of habeas corpus
stands as a safeguard against imprisonment of those held in violation
of the law.” 17 Currently, habeas corpus is codified under the amended
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1986 (hereinafter
referred to as “AEDPA” or 28 U.S.C. § 2254). 18 Federal courts may
entertain a habeas corpus petition of a state prisoner only if the
convicted defendant is in custody in violation of “the Constitution or

13

See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (incorporating the Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure and the exclusionary
rule); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (incorporating the Fifth Amendment
right against double jeopardy); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)
(incorporating the Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (incorporating the right to assistance of counsel
under the Eighth Amendment for all cases in which a jail sentence can be imposed).
14
See generally Brian Hoffstadt, The Deconstruction of Reconstruction of
Habeas, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125 (2005) (discussing the history and construction of
habeas review); see also Julie Austin, Closing a Resentencing Loophole: A Proposal
to Amend 28 U.S.C. 2255, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 909, 928, 934 (2006) (discussing the
importance of finality of judgments as a guiding principle in the Supreme Court’s
analysis of habeas review).
15
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1996) (outlining the remedy of a writ of habeas corpus
from the judgment of a state court to a federal court).
16
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 12930; 136 (Neill H. Alford, Jr. et al. eds., The Legal Classics Library 1983) (1768).
17
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 90 (2011).
18
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1996).
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laws or treaties of the United States.” 19 The relevant portion of the
AEDPA states:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court
shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was
adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless
the adjudication of the claim-(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding. 20
Once an application for writ of habeas corpus is granted, the
federal court will conduct a de novo review of the state court’s rulings
on questions of law 21 and mixed legal-factual questions. 22 On the other
hand, reviewing purely factual judgments requires the federal court to:
(1) adhere to the chain of “prior” courts whose fact-finding the court
of appeals must defer to unless those facts are “clearly erroneous[,]”
resulting in deprivation of constitutional rights; 23 and (2) examine
whether the federal district court, in adhering to the first premise,
19

§ 2254(a).
§ 2254(d).
21
Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994) (“The question of law, like the
generality of such questions must be resolved de novo on appeal.”); see also
Ellsworth v. Levenhagen, 248 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 2001).
22
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 698 (1984); see also Andersen
v. Thieret, 903 F.2d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 1990) (relying on a “de novo appellate review
of the district court’s decision on voluntariness [of confession]”); Pruitt v. Neal, 788
F.3d 248, 264 (7th Cir. 2015).
23
Mosley v. Butler, 762 F.3d 579, 585 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[W]e review factual
finding by the district court for clear error [ . . . ] reversing only if the district court’s
findings are “implausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety”).
[Parentheticals that are using full quote need to start with capital letter].
20
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properly applied the correct standard of review to the applicable state
court fact findings. 24 Additionally, for a review of a state court
decision, federal courts of appeals review the last state court that
addressed the merits of the claim, such as the Wisconsin Appellate
Court in the instant case. 25
Part I of this Article discusses the history of harmless error
analysis within habeas corpus reviews, specifically with regard to how
much deference is given to state courts under the current standard. Part
II discusses the Seventh Circuit’s majority decision and dissent in
Jensen v. Clements, where the court examined whether the Wisconsin
Appellate Court misapplied the harmless error standard in affirming
the trial court’s decision that admission of evidence that violated the
Confrontation Clause was harmless error in the jury’s guilty verdict.
Finally, this Article examines the majority and dissenting opinions in
Jensen—arguing that the Seventh Circuit incorrectly decided Jensen
based on harmless error standards and that the majority’s failure to
grant deference to the state court’s decision that erroneously admitted
evidence was harmless error. 26

24

The majority of circuits hold that in instances where a district court reviewed
mixed questions of fact and law solely on the basis of the state court record without
an evidentiary hearing, the standard appellate review on district court factual
findings should be “plenary” or “de novo” rather than the deferential “clearly
erroneous” standard of review for district court findings of fact. See, e.g., Barnett v.
Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1131 (10th Cir. 1999); Hakeem v. Beyer, 990 F.2d 750, 758
(3rd Cir. 1993); Schlup v. Armontrout, 941 F.2d 631, 637-38 (8th Cir. 1991).
However, the 7th Circuit suggested, without deciding, that the “clearly erroneous”
standard may be appropriate even for mixed questions of fact and law when the
finding is based purely on documentary evidence. Stewart v. Peters, 958 F.2d 1379,
1381-82 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 883 (1992).
25
Id.
26
This article will not discuss the confrontation clause issues in Jensen v.
Clements because there is little doubt the admitted evidence at issue violated the
Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.
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BACKGROUND
This section provides an overview of the relevant law concerning
habeas corpus review and the harmless error analysis. It begins with
the history of harmless error analysis and the standard’s development
through Chapman v. California, 27 which established the basic
standard, and Brecht v. Abrahamson, 28 which further clarified the
standard when applied in state courts. Finally, this section examines
Davis v. Ayala, 29 which further refined the harmless error standard
when state courts rule that an error in admission of evidence is
harmless, clarifying Chapman and Brecht’s standards. 30 In order to
prevail based on these standards, Petitioner must have shown that the
Wisconsin Appellate Court’s decision that the admitted evidence
constituted harmless error was “lacking in justification . . . beyond any
possibility for fairminded disagreement.” 31
A. Standard of Harmless Error.
Harmless error means “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or
variance that does not affect substantial rights.” 32 Because Jensen
involves a violation of Confrontation Clause protections, it is
important to note that a mere violation does not merit automatic
reversal but is subject to a harmless error analysis. 33 The standard for a
Confrontation Clause error to be held harmless is that “the court must
be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable
27

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993).
29
Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2197 (2015) (holding that on “direct appeal,
the harmlessness standard is the one prescribed in Chapman [ . . . but] in a collateral
proceeding, the test is different).
30
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24; Brecht, 507 U.S. at 619.
31
Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2199 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103
(2011)) (emphasis added).
32
FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a).
33
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986).
28
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doubt.” 34 Errors are truly harmless if the error does not influence the
jury in their verdict. 35 The Supreme Court outlined various factors in
Delaware v. Van Arsdall that help assess whether an error was truly
harmless. 36 The factors include: (1) the importance of the witness’
testimony in the prosecution’s case; (2) whether the testimony was
cumulative; (3) the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or
contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points; (4) the
extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted; and (5) the overall
strength of the prosecution’s case. 37
The harmless error inquiry cannot merely ask “whether there was
enough to support the result, apart from the phrase affected by the
error.” 38 Instead, the determination, using the factors in Van Arsdall, is
whether the error had no or a slight influence on the jury. 39 If there
was no or little influence then “the verdict and the judgment should
stand.” 40 However, if untainted evidence in a case is so overwhelming
and “the prejudicial effect [of tainted evidence is] so insignificant by
comparison, that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the
improper use of the admission was harmless error,” then the error had
no or only a slight influence on the jury and does not subject the
aggrieved to relief. 41
The Supreme Court in Chapman v. California outlined, in part,
that federal law rather than state law should determine what
constituted harmless error in habeas petitions and that when courts
34

Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
Id. (stating that harmless error is harmless if it “did not contribute to the
verdict obtained.”).
36
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684.
37
Id. (“these factors . . . [include] of course, the overall strength of the
prosecution’s case.”); cf. Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 432 (1972) (stating that
the “minds of the average jury would not have found the State’s case significantly
less persuasive had the [improper evidence] been excluded.”)(internal quotations
omitted).
38
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946).
39
Id. at 764.
40
Id.
41
Schneble, 405 U.S. at 430.
35
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review errors involving constitutional rights, the court must be
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless. 42
After Chapman, Congress enacted the AEDPA. 43 The AEDPA
provides that a writ of habeas corpus may not be granted unless the
state court decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law.” 44 The Supreme Court
incorporated the “unreasonable application” language into the
Chapman standard in subsequent cases, making the AEDPA and
Chapman essentially analogous. 45
The Supreme Court defined a separate standard of review in
Brecht v. Abrahamson. 46 The Court held that a petitioner is “not
entitled to relief based on trial error unless [she] can establish that it
resulted in ‘actual prejudice.’” 47 This Brecht standard distinguished
itself from the Chapman standard based on the procedural posture of
the case. 48 On a direct appeal, the Chapman standard applies. 49 On a
collateral proceeding, the Brecht standard applies. 50

42

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21, 24 (1967) (holding that prosecutors’
repeated comments about defendant’s refusal to testify, pursuant to the Fifth
Amendment, as evidence of guilt, were not harmless error beyond a reasonable
doubt).
43
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1996) (amending Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1986).
44
Jensen v. Clements (“Jensen”), 800 F.3d 892, 899 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).
45
Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18 (2003) (“[W]e may not grant
respondent’s habeas petition, however, if the state court simply erred in concluding
that the State’s errors were harmless; rather, habeas relief is appropriate only if the
[state court] applied harmless-error review in an ‘objectively unreasonable’
manner.”); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000) (An
“unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of
federal law.”).
46
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quoting United States v.
Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986)).
47
Id.
48
Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2197 (2015).
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The Brecht standard dictates that habeas relief under AEDPA can
be granted only if the federal court has “grave doubt about whether a
trial error of federal law had substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” 51 The Court held there
must be more than a “reasonable possibility” that an error was harmful
in determining the jury’s verdict. 52 Brecht also takes into account the
concerns of finality and legality that occur when a conviction is
overturned on direct review. 53 Policy-wise, states have public safety
interest in ensuring criminals are punished, 54 and re-litigation of trials
encounters significant difficulties when cases become stale—namely,
witnesses die or forget. 55
Confusion over which standard applied on review 56 was diffused
by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Davis v. Ayala. 57 In Davis,
the Court held that a state court’s harmlessness determination under
AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. §2254(d) (Chapman), is “subsumed” by the Brecht
49

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (“[B]efore a federal
constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief
that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
50
Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (“[Habeas petitioners] are not entitled to habeas
relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in ‘actual
prejudice’.”) (quoting United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986)).
51
Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2197–98 (quoting O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432,
435-36 (1995)) (internal quotations omitted).
52
Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637.
53
Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 145-46 (1998); see also Brecht, 507
U.S. at 635 (liberal allowance of habeas corpus damages the importance of trials and
“encourages habeas petitioners to relitigate their claims on collateral review”).
54
Brecht, 507 U.S. at 635; see also Calderon, 525 U.S. at 145-46 (“[The] State
is not to be put to th[e] arduous task of [a retrial] based on mere speculation that the
defendant was prejudiced by trial error; the court must find that the defendant was
actually prejudiced by the error.”).
55
William Glaberson, Courts in Slow Motion, Aided by the Defense, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 14, 2013, at A1.
56
See Benn v. Greiner, 402 F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating there is an
“open question” of which standard to apply, Chapman or Brecht, declining to resolve
this issue since both standards “produce the same result”).
57
Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2198 (2015).
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standard when a “federal habeas petitioner contests a state court’s
determination that a constitutional error was harmless under
Chapman.” 58 Clarifying this holding, the Court stated that while a
federal court reviewing habeas corpus petitions does not need to
“’formal[ly]’ apply both Brecht and ‘AEDPA/Chapman,’ AEDPA
nevertheless ‘sets forth a precondition to the grant of habeas relief.’” 59
If an inquiry has been “adjudicated on the merits” in state court,
then AEDPA/Chapman’s highly deferential standard is guiding. 60
Once it is determined that the state court made an adjudication on
merits (such as a harmless error analysis), then in order to grant relief,
the federal court must determine whether the state court’s rejection
was “(1) contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law, or (2) was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts.” 61 A state court’s decision that something
was harmless error cannot be overturned unless the state court applied
Chapman’s harmlessness analysis “in an ‘objectively unreasonable’
manner.” 62 Thus, habeas relief may not be awarded unless “the
harmlessness determination itself was unreasonable.” 63
The Supreme Court spelled out the definition of “unreasonable” in
Harrington v. Richter. 64 In Harrington, the Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit’s grant of habeas relief for a defendant convicted of murder
and other charges. 65 The Supreme Court held that while a habeas
examination must look at the arguments or theories that supported, or
could have supported, the state court’s decision, the reviewing court
must also ask “whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree

58

Id. (citing Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 120 (2007)).
Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2198 (quoting Fry, 551 U.S. at 119).
60
Id. (citing Harrington v. Richter, 551 U.S. 112, 120 (2007)).
61
Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2198.
62
Id. (citing Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18 (2003) quoting Lockyer v.
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)).
63
Fry, 551 U.S. at 119 (emphasis in original); Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2199.
64
Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102.
65
Id. at 92.
59
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that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a
prior decision of this Court.” 66
B. Deference to State Courts.
On questions of whether a harmless error determination was
indeed harmless, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) spells out that the review is
“highly deferential” 67 and any review of error hinges on whether the
harmlessness determination itself was unreasonable. 68 State factfinding in the context of federal claims is of paramount importance
and often determines whether a petitioner obtains habeas relief. 69
Section 2254(e)(1) of the AEDPA provides:
In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue
made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The
applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption
of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 70
The Seventh Circuit recognizes this deferential treatment to state
court decisions in other determinations. 71 In fact, the Seventh Circuit

66

Id. at 102; see also Felkner v. Jackson, 562 U.S. 594, 598 (2011) (holding
that the state appellate court’s decision on a Batson challenging prosecutors’ raceneutral explanations for striking jurors was not unreasonable because of evidence the
California Court of Appeals “carefully reviewed the record at some length in
upholding the trial court’s findings” and because of this the state appellate court’s
decision was “plainly not unreasonable”).
67
See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 390 (2010).
68
Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102; Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2199.
69
Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 468, 474 (1974).
70
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (1996) (emphasis added).
71
See McElvaney v. Pollard, 735 F.3d 528, 532 (7th Cir. 2013) (deference in
applying 28 U.S.C. § 2254 review to a Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel
claim).
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has followed Supreme Court precedent, 72 calling the AEDPA’s
presumption on state court factual decisions “difficult to [overcome
because of 28 U.S.C. § 2254’s] highly deferential standard.” 73 Courts
presume that the state court’s factual determinations are correct unless
a petitioner can show that the state court relied on “fact-finding that
ignores the clear and convincing weight of the evidence.” 74 Much like
McElvany v. Polland, where the Seventh Circuit stated that the state
court’s decision that trial counsel was effective must receive “the
benefit of the doubt,” and in other cases where there is a high
deferential standard, a tie should go the state court’s determination. 75
With the combination of AEDPA’s requirements for state court factual
finding deference and the Seventh Circuit’s own precedents, a federal
court simply disagreeing with a state court’s decision is not enough for
habeas relief, even if it finds constitutional error under § 2254(d). 76 As
the Supreme Court has previously stated, “the Court never has defined
the scope of the writ simply by reference to a perceived need to assure
that an individual accused of crime is afforded a trial free of
constitutional error.” 77

72

Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010) (holding that even if there is
disagreement during review about the findings in a record that alone does not
invalidate the trial court’s decision); see also Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 335
(2006) (“Reasonable minds reviewing the record might disagree . . . but on habeas
review that does not suffice to supersede the trial court’s credibility determination.”).
73
Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (quoting Harrington, 562
U.S. at 102 (2011)); see also McElvaney, 735 F.3d at 532.
74
Newman v. Harrington, 726 F.3d 921, 928 (7th Cir. 2013) (“This standard is
demanding, but not insurmountable.” (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Taylor
v. Grounds, 721 F.3d 809, 817 (7th Cir. 2013))).
75
McElvaney, 735 F.3d at 532 (quoting Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181 and holding
that the state appellate court’s determination was not so lacking in justification
beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement).
76
Harding v. Walls, 300 F.3d 824, 828 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S.
988 (2003) (citing O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995)).
77
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989) (quoting Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477
U.S. 436, 447 (1986)).
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JENSEN V. CLEMENTS 78
In Jensen v. Clements, the Seventh Circuit determined that the
harmless error analysis applied by the Wisconsin Supreme Court
violated the rules set forth in Chapman v. California 79 and Brecht v.
Abrahamson. 80 This section begins with the factual history of Jensen,
followed by a discussion of the procedural history of the case. This
section then outlines the Seventh Circuit’s majority opinion and ends
with an examination of Judge Daniel Tinder’s dissent.
A. Factual History
On December 3, 1998 Julie Jensen was discovered deceased in
her home in Pleasant Prairie, Wisconsin. 81 Two weeks prior to her
death, Julie gave her neighbors a handwritten, signed letter, telling
them that if “anything happened to her, they should give the envelope
to the police.” 82 Learning of her death, the neighbors gave Julie’s letter
to the police. 83 The letter read:
Pleasant Prairie Police Department, Ron Kosman or
Detective Ratzburg,
I took this picture [and] am writing this on Saturday 11-21-98
at 7 AM. This "list" was in my husband's business daily
planner—not meant for me to see, I don't know what it
means, but if anything happens to me, he would be my first
suspect. Our relationship has deteriorated to the polite
superficial. I know he's never forgiven me for the brief affair
I had with that creep seven years ago. Mark lives for work
[and] the kids; he's an avid surfer of the Internet
78

Jensen v. Clements (“Jensen”), 800 F.3d 892, 896 (7th Cir. 2015).
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
80
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993).
81
Jensen v. Clements (“Jensen”), 800 F.3d 892, 896 (7th Cir. 2015).
82
Id. at 895.
83
Id.
79
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Anyway, I do not smoke or drink. My mother was an
alcoholic, so I limit my drinking to one or two a week. Mark
wants me to drink more—with him in the evenings. I don't. I
would never take my life because of my kids—they are
everything to me! I regularly take Tylenol [and] multivitamins; occasionally take OTC stuff for colds, Zantac, or
Immodium; have one prescription for migraine tablets, which
Mark use[s] more than I.
I pray I'm wrong [and] nothing happens ... but I am
suspicious of Mark's behaviors [and] fear for my early
demise. However, I will not leave David [and] Douglas. My
life's greatest love, accomplishment and wish: "My 3 D's"—
Daddy (Mark), David, Douglas. 84
The letter echoed prior statements Julie made to the police in the
weeks leading up to her death. 85 Two voicemails left for the police
stated that she thought her husband, Mark Jensen (the Petitioner), was
trying to kill her. 86 When officers met with Julie about her voicemails,
she attempted to give them a roll of film she claimed was taken from
the Petitioner’s day planner. 87 Julie also repeated the statements in her
letter, saying that if she died her husband should be the first suspect. 88
However, police were unable to connect any of the film’s images to
the case. 89
After Julie’s death, police seized the Petitioner’s personal
computer and discovered a history of Internet searches concerning
suicide and poison, including an Internet search on the morning of
Julie’s death at 7:40 a.m. for “ethylene glycol poisoning,” commonly

84

Id.
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 896.
89
Id.
85
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referred to as antifreeze. 90 Also recovered from Petitioner’s computer
were emails between the Petitioner and a woman with whom he was
having an affair. 91 Evidence showed that the home computer’s Internet
history was “double-deleted.” 92 Petitioner’s work computer was not
seized because it had ‘“been fried and [Petitioner had] to get a new
one.’” 93
A medical examiner ruled Julie’s death a suicide after the first
autopsy was inconclusive. 94 However, toxicology reports from Dr.
Christopher Long stated there was a “large concentration of ethylene
glycol” in Julie’s system. 95 According to Dr. Long, Julie’s system
contained so much ethylene glycol that he concluded her death could
not have been a suicide as her body would have been too weak to
drink the amount of ethylene glycol outlined in his report. 96 Three
years later, in 2002, after an extensive investigation, Julie’s husband,
Petitioner Mark Jensen, was charged with first-degree intentional
homicide. 97
1. Pre-trial Issues Regarding the Admissibility of Julie’s Voicemails
and Letter.
The admissibility of Julie’s letter and statements to the police
before her death were a source of contention from the beginning of the
case. 98 Eventually, the State conceded that the voicemails Julie made
to the police were inadmissible hearsay, but the letter, in its entirety,
90

Id. (stating that there was 3,940 micrograms per milliliter of ethylene glycol
in the 660 ml of Julie’s stomach contents).
91
Id.
92
Id. at 910 (Tinder, J., dissenting). “Double-deleted” means someone deleted
the Internet history twice in quick succession.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 896 (majority opinion).
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id. Petitioner was charged in March 2002.
98
Id.
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was ruled admissible hearsay. 99 While awaiting trial in 2004,
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision to
allow admission of the letter after the United States Supreme Court
decided Crawford v. Washington. 100 The trial court granted the motion
and ultimately ruled that Julie’s letter and statements to the police
were testimonial and barred under Crawford. 101
In an effort to resurrect their case, the State argued that the letter
and statements were admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule:
the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing. 102 The trial court rejected the
State’s arguments. 103 As a result, the State appealed the trial court’s
order and filed an interlocutory appeal and petition to bypass directly
to the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 104 In February 2007, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court determined that Julie’s statements to the police and
handwritten letter were testimonial, but also that the trial court failed
to properly analyze whether the statements and letter were admissible
under the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine. 105
On remand from the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the trial court
found by a preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner killed Julie,
causing her absence from the trial and therefore satisfying the

99

Id.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (holding that testimonial
statements require confrontation to satisfy the constitutional demand of reliability);
Jensen, 800 F.3d at 896.
101
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 36 (trial court holding that the letter and voicemails
were testimonial because the declarant was unable to testify at trial and there was no
prior opportunity for cross-examination).
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
State v. Jensen (“Jensen I”), 2007 WI 26, ¶ 2, 299 Wis. 2d 267, 272, 727
N.W.2d 518, 521.
105
Jensen, 800 F.3d at 897 (citing Jensen I, 2007 WI at ¶ 57 where the
Wisconsin Supreme Court ultimately adopted a broad forfeiture by wrongdoing
doctrine––if the State can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the accused
caused the absence of the witness, then testimonial evidence is admissible).
100
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forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, paving the way for the admission
of Julie’s statements to police and her letter. 106
2. Petitioner’s Trial for First-Degree Intentional Homicide in Julie’s
Death.
More than nine years after Julie’s death, Petitioner’s case went to
trial. 107 During the six-week jury trial the State presented evidence of
the actions of Julie and Petitioner in the months leading up to Julie’s
death. 108 During the State’s case, the neighbor that Julie gave the letter
to testified that three weeks prior to her death, Julie said she was
“scared she was going to die” and concerned that Petitioner was trying
to poison her by “put[ting] something in the wine” and insisting Julie
drink it. 109 The neighbor also testified that Julie told him she believed
she would “not make it through one particular weekend because she
had found suspicious notes” and a computer page left open on their
home computer revealing how to poison someone. 110 Additionally, the
neighbor discussed how Julie repeatedly told him about marital
problems between her and Petitioner. 111
Another witness, Julie’s son’s teacher, testified that approximately
a week before her death, Julie told the teacher that Julie thought her
husband was trying to kill her and “’was going to make it look like a
suicide’” by putting something in her food or drink. 112 Julie told the
teacher that the Petitioner “never forgave her” for an affair she had
eight years prior. 113 The teacher also testified that Julie knew very
little about computers because a few months prior to Julie’s death the

106

Jensen, 800 F.3d at 897 (citing Jensen I, 2007 WI at ¶ 57).
Jensen, 800 F.3d at 897.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 909 (Tinder, J., dissenting).
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
107
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teacher asked Julie to help in the computer lab. 114 Julie responded to
the teacher’s request by saying, “I don’t even know how to turn one
on.” 115
The State presented additional witnesses: Julie’s physician,
Petitioner’s friend, and one of Petitioner’s co-workers. 116 Julie’s
physician testified that he saw her two days before her death and she
denied being suicidal because she “loved her children more than
anything.” 117 The physician also testified that Julie talked about an
affair she had in the past and that Petitioner had “’never really
forgiven’ her for it.” 118 Both Petitioner’s friend and co-worker testified
that they were told about an affair Julie had and even after eight years
the “[Petitioner’s] anger had not diminished” for as long as they knew
him. 119
Additionally, the friend testified that Petitioner told him that he
was trying to get Julie to relax at night by giving her wine. 120 While
being questioned by the State, the friend also described Petitioner’s
computer skills as “above average” and that in the month of Julie’s
death, Petitioner was searching for drug interactions on the Internet
“on a very frequent basis.” 121 One of the State’s main witnesses was
the Petitioner’s former cellblock mate, Aaron Dillard. 122 Dillard, who
was awaiting sentencing on his own case, testified that Petitioner
admitted to him in prison that he “had poisoned Julie and later
suffocated her by pushing her face into a pillow.” 123

114

Id.
Id. (refuting defense notion that Julie could have used the computer herself
to look for ways to commit suicide).
116
Id. at 910.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 897 (majority opinion).
123
Id. at 907.
115
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Additional evidence presented at trial indicated that Petitioner
would repeatedly place pornographic photographs around the
residence for Julie to find. 124 Petitioner told investigators that he knew
Julie believed the man she had an affair with was planting the
images. 125 While Petitioner denied placing the photographs, he did
admit that he would save the photos and use them to upset Julie when
he was “pissed off.” 126 Petitioner also told investigators that he would
leave the photos out for Julie to find, or bring them out to show
Julie. 127 The lead investigator testified that Petitioner had admitted that
his marriage with Julie was “never the same” after Julie’s affair. 128
On the morning of Julie’s death, Petitioner told the investigator
that Julie could not get up and was unable to get out of bed. 129
Petitioner also said that he did not leave that day for work until 8:00 or
9:00 a.m. 130 That fact is especially significant because the time of the
search for antifreeze poisoning occurred on the same day at 7:40
a.m. 131 Furthermore, evidence showed that on the same day, two
months before Julie’s death, the Petitioner’s computer was used to
search for methods of poisoning as well as to exchange emails with
Petitioner’s paramour about their future life together. 132
The State’s case concluded with testimony from expert witnesses:
the toxicologist, a doctor who conducted an autopsy, and a medical
examiner. 133 The toxicologist, Dr. Long, outlined his findings that
there was a “large concentration of ethylene glycol” in Julie’s system
at the time of her death. 134 However, during Dr. Long’s cross124

Id. at 910 (Tinder, J., dissenting).
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 896 (majority opinion).
132
Id. at 910 (Tinder, J., dissenting).
133
Id. at 896 (majority opinion).
134
Id.
125
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examination, it was revealed that the 660 ml of Julie’s stomach
contents contained only a half-teaspoon of ethylene glycol, or .083
ounces. 135 This revelation disclosed on cross-examination,
“destroy[ed] the foundation of [Dr. Long’s] opinion that Julie’s death
was not a suicide.” 136
The doctor that conducted one of the autopsies concluded that
Julie’s cause of death was asphyxia by smothering and the medical
examiner concluded her cause of death was “ethylene glycol poisoning
with probable terminal asphyxia.” 137 The testimony that one cause of
Julie’s death was consistent with smothering arose during the doctor’s
redirect examination. 138 The doctor examined photographs from the
scene that appeared to show Julie “with an unnaturally bent nose”
indicating something was pushed hard into Julie’s face. 139
During the defense’s case-in-chief, evidence included testimony
from Julie’s family doctor. 140 The family doctor testified that at an
appointment two days before Julie’s death, she “seemed depressed and
distraught and almost frantic, actually.” 141 Additionally, the defense
presented testimony from Julie’s neighbor. 142 The day before Julie’s
death, she had a fifteen minute conversation with her neighbor telling
her “not to worry if she did not see Julie outside that day because she
was not feeling well due to her medication.” 143 Three days prior to the
statements made to her neighbor, Julie made similar statements to her
sister-in-law. 144 She told her sister-in-law that she would be ill on
135

Id.
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 897 (“Surprisingly, this suffocation theory arose for the very first time
at the trial more than nine years after Julie’s death.”).
139
Id. Much of the expert witness testimony on the cause of death suffocation
theory was based on statements from Aaron Dillard, Petitioner’s cellblock mate.
140
Id. at 898.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
136
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December 2, 1998 (one day prior to being discovered dead) because
she expected to be placed on medication by her family doctor. 145
Additionally, a defense expert witness, Dr. Spiro, told the jury that
he examined Julie’s medical records and mental health records and
interviewed those close to her. 146 Dr. Spiro’s assessment was that Julie
was suffering from a “major depressive disorder that was complicated
by anxiety and agitation with possible delusional features, and he
concluded that she posed a significant suicide risk.” 147 Dr. Spiro’s
expert opinion was that Julie’s ingestion of antifreeze was suicidal, not
an accident or homicide. 148 Lastly, and key to the defense’s case,
although Julie made multiple statements to others about how she
thought her husband was trying to kill her via poison, she made no
attempt to seek help when she started feeling ill. 149
At argument, the State postulated that Petitioner murdered his
wife so he could be with his mistress. 150 Framing Julie’s death like a
suicide would avoid a messy divorce, and the State argued that
Petitioner searched the Internet to look for ways to make Julie’s death
look like a suicide. 151 The defense responded that Julie was unhappy,
depressed, and committed suicide to make it look like Petitioner killed
her. 152 In rebuttal, the State responded that Julie was a devoted mother,
who cared about her kids and would not leave them willingly. 153 The
State also argued that Julie could not have ingested the antifreeze
herself and Petitioner suffocated her after he realized the poison was
not having the intended effect. 154

145

Id.
Id. at 907.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 898.
150
Id. at 897.
151
Id.
152
Id. at 894-95.
153
Id.
154
Id.
146
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Julie’s handwritten letter was highlighted throughout the trial. 155
The letter was discussed at length during the State’s opening
statements. 156 The defense also talked about the letter in its opening,
even presenting it as a large exhibit for the Jury. 157 In closing, the
State’s last words to the jury on rebuttal stressed the letter, saying,
“[s]o here was her unexpressed thoughts. [Julie] wrote them down, and
she hid them away . . . Hid them away until she could resolve this
terrible dilemma she was in.” 158 The jury deliberated for nearly thirty
hours and came back with a verdict that the Petitioner was guilty of
first-degree intentional homicide. 159
3. Post-Petitioner’s Conviction.
Four months after Petitioner’s guilty verdict at the hands of a jury,
Giles v. California160 decisively narrowed the interpretation of the
forfeiture by wrongdoing statute relied on by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in its decision prior to Petitioner’s conviction. 161 Based on
Giles, the Petitioner appealed his conviction because of the state
court’s error in admitting Julie’s letter under the hearsay exception of
forfeiture by wrongdoing, directly in opposition to Giles’ decision that
for the exception to apply there must be an intention to prevent the
witness from testifying, not merely causing death. 162 The Wisconsin
155

Id.
Id. at 904-05. The letter was used to “underscore [the State’s] themes of
Petitioner’s motive, Julie’s fear, and the absence of her intent to take her own life.”
157
Id. Defense counsel described the letter to the jury, saying “[w]e’ll come
back to the letter many times during this case, and you’ll have to decide whether it’s
a blueprint for framing her husband or legitimate.”
158
Id.
159
Id. at 898.
160
See generally Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008) (reversing a
Petitioner’s conviction for first-degree murder after the victim’s out-of-court
statements were admitted under California’s forfeiture by wrongdoing statute. The
Court held that forfeiture by wrongdoing requires that the defendant intended to
prevent a witness from testifying and was not merely absent from the case).
161
State v. Jensen (“Jensen I”), 2007 WI 26, ¶ 57, 727 N.W.2d 518, 536.
162
Jensen, 800 F.3d at 897.
156
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Appellate Court subsequently found that “the disputed testimonial
evidence [, Julie’s letter and statements to police, were] erroneously
admitted” but that any error was harmless—affirming Petitioner’s
conviction. 163 Jensen petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme Court for
review of the Wisconsin Appellate Court’s decision, but that petition
was denied. 164 As a result of the denial, Petitioner filed a petition for
writ of habeas corpus in federal court. 165
In reviewing Petitioner’s habeas corpus assertions, the Eastern
District of Wisconsin held that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
unreasonably applied the Chapman standard of review, 166 stating,
“having reviewed the voluminous trial record, the court concludes that
the erroneously admitted testimonial statements had a ‘substantial and
injurious effect’ on the jury’s verdict.” 167 Making this determination,
the district court examined the “host of factors” applicable to harmless
error review and found that Julie’s “letter from the grave” cannot be
harmless when viewed in the entire context of the trial. 168 Ultimately,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
granted Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition, and the prison warden
appealed. 169
B. Seventh Circuit’s Majority Opinion.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court’s decision to grant Petitioner’s writ of
habeas corpus on the basis that the Wisconsin Appellate Court’s
harmless error determination reflected an unreasonable application of
163

State v. Jensen (“Jensen II”), 2011 WI App. 3, 331 Wis. 2d 440, 794 N.W.
2d 482, 493 (Wis. App. Ct. 2010).
164
Jensen, 800 F.3d at 898.
165
Jensen v. Schwochert (“Jensen III”), No. 11-C-0803, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 177420 at *17 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 18, 2013).
166
Id. at *31.
167
Id. (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 622 (1993)).
168
Jensen III, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177420 at *30-31.
169
Jensen, 800 F.3d at 898.
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Chapman’s substantial and injurious influence or effect standard. 170
Judge Ann Claire Williams, joined by Judge David Hamilton, outlined
the Seventh Circuit’s majority opinion detailing why admitting Julie’s
letter and out-of-court statements had substantial and injurious effect
on the jury verdict. 171
The majority first examined whether the Chapman or Brecht
standard applied, noting confusion prior to Ayala. 172 The majority
concluded that Petitioner needed to meet the Brecht standard that
incorporates Chapman’s state court decision of whether the error was
harmless. 173 In meeting the prevailing standard for review, the Seventh
Circuit questioned whether the Seventh Circuit was in “grave doubt”
about whether the confrontation error had “substantial and injurious
effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict” in the Petitioner’s
case. 174 Next, the Seventh Circuit applied their own harmless error
analysis, noting that the harmless error inquiry is “not the same as a
review for whether there was sufficient evidence at trial to support a
verdict.” 175 Finally, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the Wisconsin
State Court’s determination that the error was harmless was
unreasonable. 176

170

Id. at 895 (holding in part that Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008) was
decided before Petitioner’s claim was adjudicated on the merits by the Wisconsin
state courts).
171
Jensen, 800 F.3d at 901.
172
Id.; Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); Brecht, 507 U.S. at 619;
Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187 (2015).
173
Jensen, 800 F.3d at 901; Chapman, 386 U.S. at 18; Brecht, 507 U.S. at 619;
Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2187.
174
Jensen, 800 F.3d at 904 (emphasis in original) (quoting Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at
2198 (2015)).
175
Jensen, 800 F.3d at 902 (citing Supreme Court cases supporting the
principle that harmless error analysis is not just about sufficiency of evidence).
176
Jensen, 800 F.3d at 895.
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1. The Seventh Circuit’s Issue with the Wisconsin Appellate Court’s
Reasoning.
The Seventh Circuit took issue with the Wisconsin Appellate
Court’s reasoning, stating, “[the opinion] reads as though [the
appellate court] is conducting an evaluation of whether there was
sufficient evidence to support the verdict, not whether the error in
admitting Julie’s letter and statements to the police affected the jury’s
verdict.” 177 The majority reinforced this criticism by illustrating the
Wisconsin Appellate Court’s analysis of duplicative evidence. 178
The Wisconsin Appellate Court’s opinion stated how “[t]he rest of
the record reflects that the jury had overwhelming evidence of murder,
and upon [that] record [the jury] could rationally have concluded
beyond a reasonable doubt that [Petitioner] murdered Julie.” 179 The
Seventh Circuit pointed to this statement by the Wisconsin Appellate
Court as demonstrating “that it is conducting a review for whether
there is sufficient evidence to support a verdict” rather than the
harmless error examination required in the present case. 180
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit noted how the sufficiency of the
evidence statements by the Wisconsin Appellate Court are not just
“slips of the pen.” 181 What was lacking, the Seventh Circuit noted, was
any discussion by the Wisconsin Appellate Court about what defense
evidence rebutted the State’s, such as defense expert witnesses and
cross examination testimony. 182 To the majority, this lack of in-depth
analysis bolstered their view that the state appellate court’s opinion
was insufficient, noting that the Supreme Court has held that when
only one party’s evidence is evaluated, “no logical conclusion can be
177

Id. at 903.
Id.
179
State v. Jensen (“Jensen II”), 2011 WI App 3, ¶ 71, 331 Wis. 2d 440, 473,
794 N.W.2d 482, 498.
180
Jensen, 800 F.3d at 903-04 (noting that under direct appeal the evidence is
viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction).
181
Id. at 904.
182
Id.
178
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reached regarding the strength of contrary evidence offered by the
other side to rebut or cast doubt.” 183
2. The Seventh Circuit’s Examination of Van Arsdall’s Harmless Error
Factors.
In light of the factors outlined by the Supreme Court in Delaware
v. Van Arsdall, the Seventh Circuit then examined what influence
Julie’s letter and statements to the police had on the jury verdict. 184
The majority highlighted the first Van Arsdall factor—the importance
of the witness’ testimony in the State’s case. 185 The court pointed out
that the letter is unlike any other evidence presented in the trial; it is
Julie’s words from a time close to her death. 186 The court noted that
the letter was emotional and dramatic, used by the State in openings,
closings, and as the last words in their rebuttal argument. 187 The court
stated, “damaging evidence stands impregnable—irretrievably lodged
in the jurors’ minds.” 188
The Seventh Circuit also stressed the importance of the letter to
witnesses, the Petitioner, and the State’s case. 189 The letter was
published to the jury; twelve of the witnesses testified about the letter,
including some expert witnesses that stated the letter influenced their
opinions; and the State published Petitioner’s reaction to the letter in a
183

Id. (quoting Homes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 331 (2006)).
Jensen, 800 F.3d at 904 (“[W]e look to 'a host of factors,' such as 'the
importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony
was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting
the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination
otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case.”)
(quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986)).
185
Jensen, 800 F.3d at 904.
186
Id.
187
Id. at 904-05. Petitioner also used the letter but only as means to rebut the
State’s assertions.
188
Id. at 905 (citing United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 781 (D.C. Cir.
1973)).
189
Jensen, 800 F.3d at 905.
184
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videotaped interview with police. 190 Bolstering its viewpoint, the
majority highlighted statements made by the State during pre-trial
motions, calling the letter “essential,” “highly relevant,” and
“extraordinar[ily] valu[able].” 191 According to the Seventh Circuit, the
Wisconsin Appellate Court’s finding that the letter and statements
were harmless was unreasonable because of the amount of times the
State’s case referenced or relied on the letter. 192
The Seventh Circuit then addressed the last factor under Van
Arsdall—the overall strength of the State’s case. 193 The Seventh
Circuit derided the state appellate court for not engaging with the
defense evidence, using language from the district court that, “[a]
reader of the court of appeals’ opinion would conclude that Jensen
called no witnesses, introduced no evidence, [and] never questioned
the credibility of any witness.” 194
In examining the strength of the State’s case, particularly
addressing the State’s computer evidence, the majority discussed
testimony from the son’s teacher about Julie’s computer usage, and
lack of computer usage, from times that Petitioner was not at home. 195
The majority also responded to the Wisconsin Appellate Court’s
opinion that the State’s computer evidence was “untainted and
undisputed,” stating the evidence was far from undisputed: “[N]o
evidence precluded a jury from finding that Julie did at least some of
the Internet searches.” 196 The Seventh Circuit also highlighted defense

190

Id.
Id. at 905-06 (quoting State v. Jensen (“Jensen II”), 2011 WI App 3, ¶ 73,
331 Wis. 2d 440, 474, 794 N.W.2d 482, 499) (“[The State] also called the letter’s
admissibility ‘a make or break issue’ from the State’s perspective. While the
Wisconsin appellate court found the improperly admitted evidence added ‘nothing
significant beyond the properly admitted nontestimonial statements’”).
192
Jensen, 800 F.3d at 906.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
Id.
191
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witnesses that refuted Julie’s computer illiteracy claims, as well as the
lack of searches for poison on Petitioner’s work computer. 197
Next, the court addressed the appellate court’s failure to engage
the defense’s evidence regarding Julie’s state of mind. 198 Both the
family doctor and a defense expert testified Julie was depressed and
when the defense expert reviewed Julie’s mental health history,
determined that Julie was a significant suicide risk and her death was
likely the result of suicide. 199 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit took
issue with the amount of time it took one of the State’s witnesses to
come forward and testify. 200
Lastly, the Seventh Circuit opined that the State’s case was “no
slam dunk. The evidence was all circumstantial.” 201 In the Seventh
Circuit’s majority opinion, because the Wisconsin Appellate Court did
not formally engage any of the defense evidence and the defense had a
lot of evidence, the erroneously admitted letter and statements resulted
in actual prejudice. 202 Because of this, the majority held that the state
appellate court’s ruling was “not simply incorrect” and that “[t]he error
in admission had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury’s verdict . . . [and the result here goes] beyond
any possibility for fair-minded disagreement.” 203 As such, the Seventh
Circuit granted Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition, holding that
because Petitioner satisfied the Brecht standard, he also satisfied “the
AEDPA standard of an unreasonable application of the Chapman

197

Id. Evidence from the trial indicates that Petitioner’s work computer was
destroyed before police were able to gain access to it as part of their investigation.
198
Id. at 906-07.
199
Id. at 907.
200

Id. The witness was a friend of the Petitioner that stated Petitioner made
inculpatory statements to him about how if the Petitioner wanted to kill his wife then
there are websites showing how to poison people and he could use those.
201
Id. at 906.
202
Id. at 908.
203
Id. (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)).
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harmless error standard.” 204 Currently, Petitioner is awaiting retrial of
his wife’s murder. 205
C. Judge Tinder’s Dissent
Judge Tinder penned the dissent in the case. 206 Judge Tinder
agreed with the majority holding that Julie’s letter and statements to
the police were admitted in violation of Petitioner’s Confrontation
Clause rights. 207 However, Judge Tinder also stated that the majority
opinion improperly decided whether admitting the letter and
statements were in fact harmful. 208 The dissent outlined the
determination that fairminded jurists could agree with the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals. 209 Because of this possibility for disagreement,
coupled with the requirement that there must be deference to the state
court’s decision, Judge Tinder would uphold the decision of the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals as a reasonable application of
Chapman. 210
Judge Tinder also highlighted the standard that Petitioner must
meet to prevail on his habeas petition: “[T]o prevail, a petitioner must
show that the state court’s decision to reject his claim was so lacking
in justification that there was an error well understood and
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.” 211 Judge Tinder asserted that the Wisconsin decision
204

Jensen, 800 F.3d at 908.
Update: Bond Set For Man Convicted in Wife’s Death After Poisoning,
NBC WMTV (Jan. 6, 2016, 3:11 PM),
http://www.nbc15.com/home/headlines/15852777.html (last updated January 6,
2016) (“A judge has set a $1.2 million bond for a Wisconsin man once convicted in
his wife’s death.”).
206
Jensen, 800 F.3d at 908 (Tinder, J., dissenting).
207
Id.
208
Id. (“[W]e are not in a position to choose between two fairminded
alternatives.”).
209
Id. at 909.
210
Id.
211
Id. at 910 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)).
205
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was not so lacking. 212 In support of this contention, Judge Tinder
pointed to the Van Arsdall factors. 213
Judge Tinder addressed additional State evidence corroborating
Julie’s letter and statements to police, such as the computer evidence
and statements Julie made to other witnesses, and he pointed out that
there were multiple sources of admissible evidence “duplicating (or
corroborating) every relevant aspect of Julie’s erroneously admitted
testimonial statements.” 214 All of this evidence, the dissent stated,
contributed to the state appellate court’s characterization of the
“staggering weight of the untainted evidence and cumulatively sound
evidence presented by the State.” 215
Judge Tinder noted that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
recognized the defense theories, even noting that “’[t]his case was not
a classic whodunit,’” but rather “the jury was asked to choose between
two dark and premeditated alternatives—either [Petitioner] murdered
Julie and framed it to look like suicide, or Julie committed suicide and
framed [Petitioner] for murder.” 216 Judge Tinder went on to say that
each of Julie’s testimonial statements, as well as the other
corroborating evidence, could support either theory. 217
Referencing the majority’s rejection of the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals’ decision, the dissent also pointed out that the state appellate
court did say that it “review[ed] the extensive record”—but even if the
state appellate court had just said “affirmed,” that is enough that the
federal appellate court should give the “full deference that the habeas
corpus statute demands” of state court determinations. 218 Additionally,
the dissent highlighted that the Supreme Court’s own precedent
212

Jensen, 800 F.3d at 908 (Tinder, J., dissenting).
Id. at 909.
214
Id.
215
Id. (quoting State v. Jensen (“Jensen II”), 2011 WI App 3, ¶ 94, 331 Wis.
2d 440, 483-84, 794 N.W.2d 482, 504).
216
Jensen, 800 F.3d at 911 (Tinder, J., dissenting) (quoting Jensen III, 2011
WI App at ¶ 37).
217
Jensen, 800 F.3d at 911 (Tinder, J., dissenting).
218
Id. (citing Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98-99 (2011)).
213
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prohibits federal courts from inferring error from a state court’s failure
to address particular evidence. 219
Even though the state appellate court decision includes statements
that appear to employ a sufficiency-of-the-evidence test, there is
enough reiteration of its “finding of harmlessness based on ‘the
staggering weight of the untainted evidence and cumulatively sound
evidence presented by the State’” that lends itself to a harmlessness
inquiry. 220 Most telling to the dissent was the state appellate court
conclusion that “the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that
any error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” 221
These statements and the evidence itself leave Judge Tinder
“[un]convinced that the state court’s decision ‘was so lacking in
justification that there was an error well understood and
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.’” 222
ANALYSIS
The Seventh Circuit incorrectly decided Jensen v. Clements
because it misapplied the harmless error standard and failed to provide
enough deference to the state court’s decision. Merely having a
constitutional error is not enough to grant habeas relief. 223 Instead, the
habeas standard Petitioner must meet is that the error had substantial
and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict and
that there was actual prejudice. 224
Here, the Wisconsin Appellate Court examined the record of
Petitioner’s case and determined that any effect of the erroneously

219

Jensen, 800 F.3d at 911 (Tinder, J., dissenting) (quoting Price v. Thurmer,
637 F.3d 831, 839 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Harrington, 562 U.S. at 98-99)).
220
Jensen, 800 F.3d at 911-12 (Tinder, J., dissenting).
221
Id.
222
Id. at 911 (quoting Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2199 (2015)).
223
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989)
224
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993).
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admitted letter and statements was harmless. 225 Thus, in order to
prevail, the Petitioner “must [have] show[n] that the state court’s
decision to reject his claim ‘was so lacking in justification that there
was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law
beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” 226
The Wisconsin Appellate Court’s decision may not have been
perfectly reasoned, but their decision certainly is subject to fairminded
disagreement. As such, Petitioner should fail on this standard because
fairminded jurists did disagree on the Wisconsin Appellate Court’s
determination. 227 More than that, while this outcome may not sit well
with Petitioner, it is the correct determination when all of the Van
Arsdall factors are examined and proper deference is granted to the
state court’s determination.
A. The Seventh Circuit Incorrectly Decided Jensen v. Clements by
Misapplying the Harmless Error Standard.
As stated above, the factors for a harmless error analysis under
Van Arsdall include: (1) the importance of the witness’ testimony in
the prosecution’s case; (2) whether the testimony was cumulative; (3)
the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the
testimony of the witness on material points; (4) the extent of crossexamination otherwise permitted; and (5) the overall strength of the
prosecution’s case. 228 While the Seventh Circuit’s majority opinion
touched upon some of these factors, they failed to adequately address
each of them.
The majority highlighted at length the first Van Arsdall factor, the
importance of the inadmissible evidence, as the key to showing the

225

State v. Jensen (“Jensen II”), 2011 WI App 3, ¶ 73, 331 Wis. 2d 440, 473,
794 N.W.2d 482, 499.
226
Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2199 (emphasis added) (quoting Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)).
227
See Jensen, 800 F.3d at 911; Jensen II, 2011 WI App at ¶ 73.
228
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986).
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unreasonable nature of the Wisconsin Appellate Court’s decision. 229
However, the majority failed to emphasize the next three factors Van
Arsdall factors that inform and minimize whatever harm was found by
the Seventh Circuit’s majority. 230 All of the inadmissible evidence is
corroborated or duplicated by admissible evidence. This is why the
cumulative factors are so important; it is not an all or nothing analysis
hinging on just the importance of the inadmissible evidence. If the
examination did hinge on just one of the factors, then the Seventh
Circuit would not have reiterated the Supreme Court’s decision that all
the factors guide this analysis and play an important role. 231 To be
clear, this Article does not argue that the letter was unimportant or
non-violative of Petitioner’s Confrontation right. However, the mere
fact that witnesses discussed Julie’s letter and the State highlighted
their testimony in argument is only one factor in the overall analysis of
whether admitting the letter was ultimately injurious and had an effect
on the jury’s verdict.
Illustrating factors two and three of Van Arsdall’s holding, the
Wisconsin Appellate Court went through each and every line in Julie’s
letter—all three paragraphs—and examined how the inadmissible
evidence was corroborated or duplicated by admissible evidence. 232
Family, friends, neighbors, acquaintances, and police officers all
testified to statements Julie made to them that corroborated
information in the letter. 233 The corroboration did not stop with live
testimony; even physical evidence recovered from Petitioner’s home
computer echoed Julie’s statements to friends about Petitioner
searching for ways to poison someone on the internet. 234
Furthermore, factor four is satisfied because the defense had an
opportunity to cross-examine each and every one of the corroborating
witnesses and rebut any physical evidence through their own experts
229

Jensen, 800 F.3d at 905-06.
Id. at 906.
231
Id. at 904.
232
Jensen II, 2011 WI App at ¶¶ 40-73.
233
Id.
234
Jensen, 800 F.3d at 910 (Tinder, J., dissenting).
230
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or argument. “Cross examination is ‘the greatest legal engine ever
invented for the discovery of truth’” 235 and Petitioner cross-examined
the State’s witnesses. There were even questions at trial about the
authenticity of the letter itself. 236 Yet, any impeachment was
apparently unpersuasive to the jury. 237
Finally, the Seventh Circuit’s majority extensively examined the
final Van Arsdall factor, the overall strength of the prosecution’s
case. 238 The majority repeatedly remarked about statements made by
the Wisconsin Appellate Court regarding the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the verdict. 239 The Seventh Circuit worried the
state appellate court was unconcerned with the Brecht harmless error
analysis, instead focusing on an incorrect sufficiency of the evidence
test. 240 However, the statements by the Wisconsin Appellate Court
regarding the strength of the evidence of guilt are illustrative of the
last Van Arsdall factor, rather than a superficial examination of the
sufficiency of guilt as the Seventh Circuit contends. 241
The majority cited to Holmes v. South Carolina, stating that if
only one side is evaluated on review, “no logical conclusion can be
reached regarding the strength of contrary evidence offered by the
other side to rebut or cast doubt.” 242 However, the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals did “review the extensive record” and examined “the
voluminous corroborating evidence, the duplicative untainted

235

Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 124 (1999) (internal quotations omitted)
(quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)).
236
Jensen, 800 F.3d at 911 (Tinder, J., dissenting).
237
Id. at 898 (majority opinion); see also Jensen II, 2011 WI App at ¶ 88. One
of the detectives was impeached on his testimony that Petitioner admitted he was the
principle computer user in the house and that Julie rarely used the computer.
238
Jensen, 800 F.3d at 906.
239
Id. at 903-04.
240
Id.
241
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986).
242
Jensen, 800 F.3d at 904 (quoting Homes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319,
331 (2006)).
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evidence, the nature of the defense, the nature of the State’s case, and
the overall strength of the State’s case.” 243
The First Circuit was faced with a similar issue in Barbosa v.
Mitchell, in January of 2016. 244 In Barbosa, an inmate petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus because a DNA expert’s testimony included a
DNA “results table” that was clearly in violation of established law
under the Confrontation Clause. 245 Relying almost entirely on factor
four of Van Arsdall, the First Circuit found that there was an
“abundance of other evidence indicating [petitioner’s] guilt.” 246 Based
on the “force of this [cumulative] evidence as a whole” the First
Circuit determined the inadmissible DNA table was “largely
cumulative evidence” and could not conclude that the violative
evidence had “a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict.” 247 As
in Barbosa, the Seventh Circuit here was obliged to give great weight
to the Van Arsdall factors that the evidence was cumulative, there was
corroborating testimony, and the strength of the prosecution’s case.
The Wisconsin Appellate Court went further than the state court on
review in Barbosa, discussing how they reviewed the “extensive
record” and conducting a meticulous evaluation of the evidence. 248
Lastly, the Seventh Circuit opined that the evidence in the case
was all circumstantial and subject to more than one interpretation, but
this statement cuts both ways. 249 Circumstantial evidence can be just
as reliable as direct evidence, as the Supreme Court has held, “[t]he
adequacy of circumstantial evidence also extends beyond civil cases;
we have never questioned the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in

243

State v. Jensen (“Jensen II”), 2011 WI App 3, ¶ 35, 331 Wis. 2d 440, 462,
794 N.W.2d 482, 493 (emphasis added).
244
Barbosa v. Mitchell, 812 F.3d 62, 68 (1st Cir. 2016).
245
Id.
246
Id.
247
Id. at 69.
248
State v. Jensen (“Jensen II”), 2011 WI App 3, ¶ 97, 331 Wis. 2d 440, 485,
794 N.W.2d 482, 504 (emphasis added).
249
Jensen v. Clements (“Jensen”), 800 F.3d 892, 906 (7th Cir. 2015).
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support of a criminal conviction.” 250 In fact, there are no instances
where the Supreme Court has said that circumstantial evidence is
weaker than direct evidence. 251 Just because Petitioner’s verdict relied
on evidence that may be circumstantial or subject to more than one
interpretation does not eviscerate or weaken that verdict. 252 The only
question relevant in the instant case is if the Wisconsin State Court’s
decision was so lacking in justification that there is no possibility for
fair-minded disagreement on the harmless error analysis. 253 The
answer is no; there is the possibility for fair-minded disagreement in
that fair-minds could conclude that the Wisconsin State Court’s
decision to admit the handwritten letter constituted harmless error.
B. The Seventh Circuit Failed to Show Enough Deference to the
Wisconsin Appellate Court’s Decision that Any Error was Harmless.
In addition to the Seventh Circuit’s tilted application of the
harmless error analysis, the Seventh Circuit should have deferred to
the Wisconsin Appellate Court’s findings that the admission of Julie’s
letters and statements were harmless error. The “highly deferential”
review under § 2254(d) defers to state court decisions of fact unless
those determinations were unreasonable. 254 Here, the Wisconsin
appellate court determined that the wrongly admitted evidence did not
have a substantial and injurious effect on the Petitioner. Merely
because the Seventh Circuit could have reached a different conclusion
does not overcome § 2254(d)(2)’s requirement for state court

250

Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) (circumstantial
evidence is “intrinsically no different from testimonial evidence”).
251
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100 (2003).
252
The majority also makes mention that nothing was found on Petitioner’s
work computer, but the computer was “fried” prior to being seized by the police; see
Jensen, 800 F.3d at 910 (Tinder, J., dissenting).
253
Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2199 (2015) (quoting Harrington v.
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)).
254
Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102; Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2199.
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substantial deference. 255 Even under a de novo review of the record,
there is ample evidence that the Wisconsin Appellate Court applied the
Van Arsdall factors. 256 Since the above sections of this Article
establish that the Seventh Circuit erred in deciding that the Wisconsin
Appellate Court’s determination was unreasonable, the state court’s
decision must stand.
As Judge Posner stated in Price v. Thurmer, where a habeas
Petitioner asked for relief on an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, the Wisconsin Court of Appeal’s opinion, which “ignored a
good deal of the evidence on which his claim for relief was based,”
still had to be given full deference. 257 After the Supreme Court’s ruling
in Harrington, 258 Judge Posner stated, “a state court ‘opinion’
consisting of a single word ‘affirmed’ is entitled to the full deference
that the habeas corpus statute demands.” 259 Because of the Supreme
Court ruling in Harrington, the Seventh Circuit held in Price that they
could not infer error from the Wisconsin court’s failure to address
particular evidence. 260
Other circuits have come to a similar conclusion regarding
interpretation of Harrington. 261 For example, in 2015 the Fourth
Circuit in Christian v. Ballard decided that a petitioner’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim during a guilty plea was not an
unreasonable application of the “clearly established” principles of the

255

Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2277 (2015) (holding that the state
court erroneously found that a prisoner was improperly denied a hearing to
determine whether he was intellectually disabled and precluded from his death
sentence).
256
See supra Part(A).
257
Price v. Thurmer, 637 F.3d 831, 839 (7th Cir. 2011).
258
Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102.
259
Price, 637 F.3d at 839; contra Contreras v. Artus, 778 F.3d 97, 106 (2d Cir.
2015) (holding that a petitioner’s denial of habeas relief was not unreasonable
because the state court did a long summation of the facts, including the defense
evidence).
260
Price, 637 F.3d at 839.
261
Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102; Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2199 (2015).
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Strickland v. Washington standard of effective assistance of counsel. 262
The Fourth Circuit stated that the requirement of a petitioner’s
showing that the claim “resulted from an unreasonable legal or factual
conclusion” beyond any fair-minded disagreement “does not require
that there be an opinion from the state court explaining the state
court’s reasoning.” 263
As a result, even when a state court’s decision is “unaccompanied
by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden must still be met” by
showing that there was no reasonable basis and that it is impossible for
fair-minded jurists to agree on arguments or theories.” 264 That same
wisdom espoused by the Seventh Circuit in Price should also apply to
the instant case. While the Wisconsin Appellate Court could have done
a better job of addressing all the evidence, the length of the trial and
“extensive record” dictated that the state court’s opinion only address
information they believed relevant to the Van Arsdall harmless error
factors. 265
The Wisconsin Appellate Court went beyond merely saying
“affirmed,” and instead examined the “voluminous [evidence,] . . . the
nature of the defense . . . [and] the overall strength of the State’s
case.” 266 Given that there is no requirement that fair-minded jurists
must all agree with the state court decision, the Wisconsin Appellate
Court’s determination that any error from the inadmissible evidence
was harmless and should stand.
The Supreme Court stated in Harrington that the habeas standard
is “difficult to meet . . . because it was meant to be.” 267 Federal habeas
jurisdiction is designed so that state courts are the “principal forum for
262

Christian v. Ballard, 792 F.3d 427, 445-46 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing Strickland
v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668, 671 (1984)).
263
Christian, 792 F.3d at 444-45 (internal quotations omitted) (citing
Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102).
264
Christian, 792 F.3d at 445; see also McKinney v. Ryan, 813 F.3d 798, 83839 (Bea, J., dissenting).
265
State v. Jensen (“Jensen II”), 2011 WI App 3, ¶ 35, 331 Wis. 2d 440, 462,
794 N.W.2d 482, 493.
266
Id. at ¶ 35 (emphasis added).
267
Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102.
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asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions.” 268 This is
because federal habeas petitions “frustrate[] both States’ sovereign
power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor
constitutional rights” and “disturb[] the State’s significant interest in
repose for conclud[ing] litigation, deny[ing] society the right to punish
admitted offenders, and intrud[ing] on state sovereignty to a degree
matched by few exercises of judicial authority.” 269 Much like
Harrington, the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Jensen, “illustrates a lack
of deference to the state court’s determination and an improper
intervention in state criminal processes, contrary to the . . . wellsettled meaning and function of habeas corpus in the federal
system.” 270
CONCLUSION
In Jensen v. Clements, the Seventh Circuit held that the Wisconsin
Appellate Court unreasonably applied federal law when it determined
that the admission of Julie’s letter and statements was harmless error.
The majority’s application of the harmless error analysis fails to
properly examine all of the relevant factors and evidence and fails to
adequately grant deference to the state court, as required by the habeas
statute itself. 271 The Seventh Circuit’s fact-intensive analysis of
Jensen, and Judge Tinder’s dissent, shows that the state court’s
decision should be granted a high level of deference and was not “so
lacking in justification that there -was an error well- understood and
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.” 272 Holding otherwise undermines the meaning of
268

Id. at 109.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Calderon v. Thompson, 523
U.S. 538, 555-556 (1998) and Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265 (1989) (Kennedy,
J., dissenting)).
270
Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102.
271
Jensen, 800 F.3d at 911 (Tinder, J., dissenting) (citing Harrington v.
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98-99 (2011)).
272
Jensen v. Clements (“Jensen”), 800 F.3d 892, 909, 910 (7th Cir. 2015)
(Tinder, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103).
269
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habeas review and States’ sovereign rights and interests in punishing
criminals, which ultimately serves to weaken the finality and legality
that attaches to convictions after all review is exhausted. 273

273

See Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 145-46 (1998) (noting that states
have a sovereign interest in punishing offenders when examining the Brecht
standard).
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